大象传媒

All disruptive social movements are met with stern warnings from people who think they know better. The current movement to 鈥淒efund the Police鈥� is no exception.

Thus an editor of the Detroit Free Press professes sympathy for the protesters鈥� aims but their 鈥渁wful slogan鈥� is 鈥渁lienating鈥� to the public, including to 鈥淲hite people who feel more reassured than threatened鈥� by the police. Other pundits that 鈥渁ctivists who are demanding radical change鈥� are paving the way for Trump鈥檚 reelection: 鈥淒efund the Police鈥� is 鈥渕usic to Trump鈥檚 ears鈥� because it baits the Democrats into endorsing this presumably unpopular demand.

These critics share an assumption about : Movements must win over the majority of the public; once they do so, that sentiment soon finds its way into policy changes.

This argument has several problems. One is that government so frequently disobeys the will of the majority. Statistical analyses that compare public preferences and policy that the opinions of non-wealthy people 鈥渉ave little or no independent influence on policy.鈥� Having the support of the majority is no guarantee of change, to say the least.

Also problematic is the assumption that radical demands or actions scare away the public. The empirical evidence is mixed, but the 54% support for the recent burning of the Minneapolis police precinct should make us skeptical of conventional wisdom.

But the biggest problem with the We-Must-Persuade-the-Majority argument is that most progressive victories in U.S. history did not enjoy majority support when they were won. In case after case, a radical minority disrupted the functioning of businesses and state institutions, which sought to restore stability by granting concessions and ordering politicians to do the same.

Their Own Emancipation Proclamations

Before the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln had criticized slavery but opposed immediate abolition. In 1837 he 鈥渟lavery is founded on injustice and bad policy, but that the promulgation of abolition doctrines tends to increase rather than abate its evils.鈥� Even 16 months into the war, Lincoln still stressed that 鈥渕y paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union,鈥� and that 鈥渋f I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it.鈥� By all indications, most Northern Whites shared Lincoln鈥檚 position.

In contrast, the formerly enslaved Frederick Douglass criticized 鈥渢hose who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation,鈥� saying that they 鈥渨ant crops without plowing up the ground,鈥� and 鈥渢he ocean without the awful roar of its many waters.鈥� Douglass celebrated John Brown鈥檚 1859 raid on the Harpers Ferry arsenal, which forced slavery into the center of debate: 鈥淯ntil this blow was struck, the prospect for freedom was dim, shadowy, and uncertain.鈥�

Enslaved workers themselves played a decisive role. By fleeing the plantations, burning property, fighting for the Union, and numerous other acts of resistance, they weakened the Confederacy and impelled Union leaders to embrace the pragmatic logic of emancipation as a way of undermining their enemies. This 鈥済eneral strike鈥� of enslaved people was a key theme in W.E.B. Du Bois鈥� classic 1935 book Black Reconstruction in America, and that thesis has been confirmed and expanded by recent . In Vincent Harding鈥檚 words, it was 鈥渃ourageous Black men and women and children鈥� who 鈥渃reated and signed their own emancipation proclamations, and seized the time.鈥�

Thus it was a militant minority鈥攅nslaved Black people in the South, aided by abolitionists such as Douglass and Brown in the North鈥攚ho transformed the war to 鈥渟ave the Union鈥� into an antislavery revolution.

The Moderates Get Alienated

The Black freedom struggles a century later were likewise the work of a minority. Most of the public either favored segregation outright or criticized segregation and the disruptive tactics of civil rights activists. Even many established Black leaders criticized the disruptive approach, favoring a purely legal strategy instead.

In a 1961 Gallup , 61% of respondents disapproved of the Freedom Riders who rode integrated buses into the South. A similar percentage condemned the sit-ins at lunch counters. Three years later, 74% said, in an echo of Lincoln, that 鈥渕ass demonstrations by Negroes are more likely to hurt the Negro鈥檚 cause for racial equality.鈥�

Such attitudes inspired Martin Luther King Jr.鈥檚 1963 鈥淟etter from a Birmingham Jail,鈥� which brilliantly skewered 鈥渢he white moderate, who is more devoted to 鈥榦rder鈥� than to justice.鈥� King later dismissed warnings about alienating 鈥渨hite middle-class support鈥� by , 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think that a person who is truly committed is ever alienated completely by tactics.鈥� Ultimately, 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think in a social revolution you can always retain support of the moderates.鈥�

Like the enslaved people who sabotaged the Confederate war effort, Black activists of the 1960s faced opposition or ambivalence from the majority. They succeeded because they imposed on the Southern elite, through boycotts, sit-ins, and other means. Thus it was the White business owners in places such as Birmingham who capitulated first, and who directed the rest of the White power structure鈥攑olice, mayors, legislators, and so on鈥攖o allow desegregation.

The Wise Men Get Shaken

Another major progressive victory of that era, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, came about for similar reasons. Public opinion and Congress were peripheral to the war鈥檚 end. Far more important was the unabating Vietnamese resistance, most notably the January 1968 Tet Offensive against the U.S. occupation and client regime in South Vietnam.

Tet catalyzed two decisive shifts. One was among U.S. business leaders, who concluded that the war was a drag on their profits. Lyndon Johnson鈥檚 March 1968 decision to de-escalate the war came five days after he met with his 鈥淲ise Men,鈥� a group of top business leaders and former government officials. Insider accounts report that Johnson was 鈥渄eeply shaken鈥� by the meeting and left with 鈥渘o doubt that a large majority鈥� of the Wise Men 鈥渇elt the present policy was at a dead end.鈥�

Tet also accelerated the rebellion among U.S. soldiers. The people needed to fight the war increasingly disobeyed, deserted, declined to enlist or reenlist, and even killed the commanding officers who sent them on death missions. By 1971 military leaders warned of 鈥渁 personnel crisis that borders on disaster,鈥� and actually demanded that Nixon speed up the withdrawal. My co-authors and I tell this story in more detail in a new book, .

Public opinion often shifts toward the radicals after the fact. In 1966, 59% the Vietnam War was 鈥渕orally justified.鈥� A decade later, 70% the war was 鈥渇undamentally wrong and immoral.鈥� In the years in between, radicals such as MLK had U.S. intervention in Vietnam as 鈥渙ne of the most unjust wars that has ever been fought in the history of the world.鈥� As usual, the radicals endured a barrage of vitriol from respected , and King and many others paid for their radicalism with their lives.

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The lesson of these past victories is that successful change depends not on majority opinion, but on the ability of the key participants in a system to disrupt that system: enslaved Black people in the Confederacy, Black consumers in Birmingham, the Vietnamese people and U.S. soldiers in Vietnam (or workers in a workplace, tenants in a building, and so on).

This is a major advantage of non-electoral forms of activism. Electoral campaigns require a majority of voters. Non-electoral strategies do not. 

It鈥檚 not that the opinions of the majority are irrelevant. Certainly it鈥檚 good to have more people sympathizing with you. Most of the radicals in the above movements realized that. They understood the importance of organizing, building relationships, and doing educational work among the public. They thought carefully about tactics.

But they also recognized, as King did, that 鈥測ou can鈥檛 always retain support of the moderates.鈥�

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Interested in Kevin Young’s new book, Levers of Power: How the 1% Rules and What the 99% Can Do About It? Read an excerpt here.